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THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE:
AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW
Robert P. Shayt
I
A CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIVES
To an economist the first two basic assumptions of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) represent a real step forward from the
philosophy underlying existing legislation governing the extension
of credit to consumers:
First, the successful American way of permitting competition
to determine prices of non-monopoly commodities and services
should also be allowed to apply to the pricing of money and
credit;
Second, usury laws imposing inflexible price ceilings on money
and credit are historical vestiges of the erroneous supposition that
emperors, kings and governments could effectively fix all prices;
the need to escape the rigidity of usury laws has led to special
laws, which only the expert can find or understand, for most types
of credit transactions requiring a charge higher than the usury
rate.'
In the automobile finance market, the price of financing has been
established competitively at average levels well below legal rate ceil-
t Professor of Banking and Finance, Graduate School of Business, Columbia Uni-
versity. Ph.D. 1951, University of Virginia.
1 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note at 6 (Revised Final Draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as UCCO]. The final draft was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 30, 1968 and by the American Bar
Association on August 7, 1968. The revised final draft appears in the CCH INsrAL.
CREnrr GumE No. 191 (extra ed. Dec. 12, 1968).
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ings.2 The automobile credit market is not the sole province of one
type of creditor-indeed it is shared by sales finance companies, com-
mercial banks, credit unions, retailers, and others. Over the years, the
price of automobile financing has declined, due to both the increased
credit-worthiness of consumer borrowers and the increased interest
among institutional creditors in financing their purchases. Entry into
the automobile financing market is easy. Virtually anyone can set up
a business to purchase credit contracts from dealers, even though the
right to make automobile cash loans at rates which exceed usury is
restricted to certain types of financial institutions. Surely other con-
sumer credit markets can be made to function competitively as well,
and the. basic assumption of the UCCO that money and credit can be
priced competitively is indeed refreshing and relevant to most partic-
ipants in the consumer credit market. To further enhance competition,
the Code, under the influence of the federal Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act,3 now provides for complete disclosure of annual rates of
charge to a borrowing public which should be capable, for the most
part, of managing its own finances with such information. Yet it is
questionable how effectively the Code deals with those consumer bor-
rowers requiring protection from free market prices, In general, how-
ever, the basic assumptions of the UCCC deserve praise, since usury
and other restrictive rate ceilings represent an obvious interference
with price competition.
I shall concur in and let the readers of this article applaud the
next basic assumption of the UCCC:
Third, consumer credit legislation should be contained in one
law so that any attorney can quickly and effectively advise his con-
sumer client.4
The fourth assumption is complex, and has led to difficulties
among the "interest groups" affected by the Code:
Fourth, for competition effectively to determine the pricing of
money and credit requires:
a. for credit grantors, relatively easy entry into the market
to avoid monopoly;
b. for knowledgeable and sophisticated credit recipients,
eliminating or at least minimizing controls;
c. for the protection of less knowledgeable and less sophisti-
cated credit recipients:
2 R. SHLAY, NEW AUTOMOBILE FINANCE RATEs, 1924-62, at 11 (Nat'l Bur. of Econ.
Res., OP 86, 1963).
3 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. 1969).
4 UCCO, Prefatory Note at 6.
[Vol. 54:491
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
1. uniform diselosure of the costs and terfas of credit to
permit informed judgments as to whether or not to
use credit, to facilitate "shopping for credit," and to
enable the forces of competition to work freely;
2. ceilings on the price of credit, restriction on creditors'
rights and remedies, and enhancements of debtors'
rights dnd remedies sufficient to prevent overreaching
by creditors without unduly limiting the availability
of credit;
3. administrative powers and self-executing judicial rem-
edies ample to assure compliance with statutory re-
quirements;
4. enough financial resources available to the Admin-
istrator to enable him effectively to exercise the
powers of his office; and
5. a broad-gauged Advisory Council to advise the Ad-
ministrator in the exercise of his powers in the in-
terests of our entire society and economy.5
The fourth basic assumption poses the major problems confronted by
the Code's proponents because, uinlike the general goals to which no
one would object, it charts the specific means to achieve those goals.
The effort to implement competition with an "umbrella-type" Code
covering all vendors and lenders who offer consumer credit raises the
question of how to reach a consensus among those affected when com-
petition replaces the protection of existing statutes. Everyone is in favor
of competition when it doesn't hurt, but the social justification for
competition is that it must harm someone when it removes those ele-
ments of profit based upon privilege rather than performance. The
draftsmen and Special Committee charged with drawing up the UCCC
were given the opportunity and challenge of working with an Advisory
Committee composed of twenty-one persons "representative of affected
segments of the public and of the consumer credit industry," as well
as with twenty-six members of panels of advisors on specific subjects
drawn from similar sources but with more specialized backgrounds.7
Good legislation could not have been written without the specialized
knowledge possessed by members of the Advisory Committee and the
panels. A challenge, however, was posed by those on the Advisory
Committee who considered withdrawing the support of their interest
groups when realignment of laws would threaten their constituencies.
The theory, of course, was to iron out basic disagreements before the
5 Id. at 6-7.
8 Id. at 9.
7 Id. at 9-10,
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Code was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and then to go to the state legislatures
with as many supporters as could be marshalled from those consulted.
But the result is that elements of the desired program may have been
compromised to solve disagreements.
This article will examine the major features of the UCCC against
the "basic assumptions" listed above. Then, the following questions
will be considered: How well does the Code meet the objectives set?
What are the areas of compromise and what appear to be the costs?
Will the consumer credit market be better served by the UCCC?
II
RATE CEILINGS, COMPETITION AND THE PRICING OF MONEY AND CREDIT
One reason the UCCC represents such a startling departure from
the past is its willingness to rely, as much as it does, upon competition
to govern the cost of loans to consumers. It effectively repeals legal
ceilings upon contractual rates set under general usury statutes for con-
sumer loans.8 It also repeals all previous rate ceilings applicable to
consumer credit transactions covered in the UCCC except for the maxi-
mum charges applicable to pawnbrokers.9
A. Closed-end Credit Transactions
A single set of rate ceilings in the UCCC, graduated downward as
size of credit increases, replaces most other rate ceilings now existing
in current statutes. The UCCC ceilings are intended merely to set an
upper boundary for rates which are expected to be set competitively
at lower levels. The rate ceilings limit finance charges to the greater of
either of the following, calculated according to the United States rule:
(a) the total of
(i) 36 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances
of the amount financed which is $300 or less;
(ii) 21 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances
of the amount financed which is more than $300 but
does not exceed $1,000; and
(iii) 15 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances
of the amount financed which is more than $1,000; or
(b) 18 per cent per year on the unpaid balances of the amount
financed.' 0
s Id. § 9.103.
9 Id.
10 Id. § 2.201. This section applies to consumer credit sales other than revolving
charge accounts. Section 3.508 applies to supervised loans and embodies identical lan-
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The rate ceilings listed under (a) are applicable to all closed-end
retail instalment sales and contracts and closed-end and open-end
instalment loans made by supervised financial institutions. Unsuper-
vised instalment loans are subject to a single rate ceiling of eighteen
per cent per year."
The reliance upon competition, rather than regulation, to set rates
is consistent with the stage of development of consumer credit in the
United States. Although consumer credit has grown faster than income,
this growth is justified by the greater affluence of society as a whole.
No longer is credit use, either in the form of money loans or the
credit sale of goods and service, regarded as a stigma indicating in-
ability of a family to manage its resources wisely. No longer is consumer
credit considered an "unproductive" use of loanable funds in the lexi-
con of economists-rather, it is an important, and probably essential,
means of maintaining production and employment in our mass produc-
tion economy. Finally, with widespread credit use at all but the very
highest and lowest income levels, the instalment credit market is cer-
tainly broad enough, and can be made competitive enough, to allow its
price to be set by the forces of supply and demand. The UCCC has,
however, adopted rate ceilings. The main purpose for price ceilings
in this or any other market is to offset the superior position of the
monopolist who, like the traditional Shylock, could exploit the needy
and underprivileged. Another reason for price ceilings would be to
discourage credit use by enacting restrictive rate ceilings on the
grounds that credit should be diverted elsewhere. Neither argument
has relevance today except in areas of poverty where both ignorance
and need abound.
The rate ceilings set by the UCCC are not high when compared
with some state statutes.12 But since the UCCC rate ceilings cover all
forms of consumer instalment credit, they should be compared with
the highest existing rate ceilings or with rates in areas currently with-
out ceilings. In cash lending, the relevant statutes are the consumer
finance or small loan laws,13 and, on the non-money lending side, the
guage. Section 1.301(17) defines the United States rule. Section 2.304, Comment 2, dis-
cusses operation of the rule.
11 Id. § 3.201.
12 E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 06.02.010 to -.360 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-301 to -324
(1959); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 5591-01 to -20 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-701 to -796
(1962).
13 These laws, for the most part, are based upon the Uniform Small Loan Law,
drafted by the Russell Sage Foundation with the assistance of a group of money lenders
in 1916. Successive revisions of the model act were recommended in 1918, 1919, 1923,
1932, 1935, and 1942. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 16 (1965).
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statutes governing retail instalment selling.14
1. Cash Lending Rate Ceilings
Of those states with small loan laws, fifteen would find some
segment of the UCCC rate ceilings below current ceilings.15 For
the most part, these are the rate ceilings on small-sized loans up
to $300 which are governed by the thirty-six per cent limit under
the UCCC.16 The impact of lower rate ceilings in the smallest
size loan brackets will fall primarily upon marginal borrowers who
cannot qualify for larger loans. There are two schools of thought
concerning the desirability of such loans. One school holds that the
poorest class of borrowers deserves the right to borrow at any rate
which reflects the true costs of extending credit (including a competi-
tive return for the risk assumed). Under this theory, the true test of
the loan should be whether the borrower can repay without the harass-
ment practiced by illegal (unlicensed) lenders. The other school holds
that the availability of credit to borrowers who can qualify for credit
only at rates above thirty-six per cent does a disservice because it leads
them to take on liabilities which are costly and which they cannot
afford.
To the economist, however, the real test of what one can afford
stems from the intensity of the want or need for credit in relation to
the borrower's ability to repay. Many expenditures have an urgency to
individuals which are well worth more than thirty-six per cent per
annum, but the political question is whether removing all rate ceilings
will not only allow those expenditures but will also permit other less
essential borrowing by persons whose ability to judge the relation
between desire, need, and cost is questionable. What is often not
realized is that a legal rate ceiling merely drives cash borrowers to loan
sharks where they must pay the added premium for the lender's risk
that he will be caught breaking the law.
The UCCC fully recognizes the dangers of driving borrowers to
loan sharks, 17 but it succumbed to the thirty-six per cent rate ceilings
which will make loans of $100 or less virtually unobtainable. The high
14 See id. at 91-123.
15 E.g., Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming,
as of Jan. 1, 1968. Data for these comparisons were supplied to the author by Mr. Hel-
muth Miller of the Beneficial Finance Company.
1.6 UCCC § 3.508. Nine states legislated higher rate ceilings on $300 loans, eleven had
higher rate ceilings on $200 loans, and fourteen had higher rate ceilings on $100 loans.
Finally, Georgia's peculiar rate ceiling was higher only on loans of $500 or more. Data
based on small loan laws existing on Jan. 1, 1968 in 47 states. States included are those
whose laws bear some similarity to the Uniform Small Loan Law.
17 UCCC, Prefatory Note at 7.
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fixed costs of placing a loan on the books requires the rate of gross in-
come in relation to the amount outstanding to be progressively higher
as loan size becomes smaller, and, on loans of less than $300, the rate
required to cover costs and obtain profit rises much more rapidly than,
say, the rate on loans between $L000 and $500.
On the other hand, the thirty-six per cent rate ceiling on loans up
to $300 represents a higher rate ceiling than is now in effect in many
states, so the UCC determination represents a compromise among
diverse philosophies of rate ceilings in existing small loan laws. Yet, to
be consistent with the UCCC philosophy "to set ceilings and not to fix
rates,"'I s a more desirable step would have been to raise the rate ceiling
on loans of $300 or less: perhaps to forty-eight per cent on loans of
$100 or less, and forty-two per cent on loans between $100 and $300.
The expectation, of course, would be that loans which would have
been made at thirty-six per cent per annum under the present rate
ceiling would still be made at thirty-six per cent for competitive rea-
sons. If it turned out that all rates rose to the forty-eight or forty-two
per cent levels, this would provide evidence that competition did not
work and that regulation is necessary to keep rates lower. Furthermore,
it is easier to obtain legislative action to lower rate ceilings than to try
to raise rate ceilings after low ceilings have been in effect.
The remaining slope of the rate ceiling structure for small loans
in the UCCC appears to be consistently within the range of the higher
ceilings currently in effect. The justification for high rate ceilings as
explained by the Code is that they are designed to provide for more
effective competition and limitations on creditors' remedies.19 The
absence of special rate ceilings by type of lender or item financed, in-
creased freedom of entry, and disclosure requirements are all expected
to provide added competitive impetus so that the presence of higher
rate ceilings will not increase the cost of credit to current borrowers.
Yet the limitation on creditors' remedies directly requires higher rate
ceilings if marginal credit risks are to continue to be served.
2. Retail Instalment Sales and Instalment Loan Rate Ceilings
A major accomplishment of the UCCC is that it provides uniform
rate ceilings for both instalment credit sales and instalment cash loans
of the closed-end variety.26 This encompasses the great bulk of con-
sumer instalment credit ;2 This uniformity breaks dowh in the open-
18 Id. § 2.201, Commnent 1.
19 Id.
20 Id. §§ 2-201, 8.508. It also allows supervised lenders to make opefi-end loans under
these rate ceilings. Id. § 3.508.
21 While the proportion of total instalment credit outstanding which is closed-end
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end sector where open-end credit sales (retailers' revolving credit plans)
are allowed to have higher rate ceilings than open-end loans (bank
credit cards and check-credit plans), unless these loans are made by
supervised lenders.22
Because of the exemption from usury statutes given by most courts
to retail instalment sales, retail instalment financing developed in the
early twentieth century largely free of regulation until 1935 when
Indiana enacted legislation governing the financing of "all goods," and
Wisconsin passed a motor vehicle instalment sales act. Today all but
four states have laws governing some aspects of retail instalment
sales.23 These laws all contain contract and disclosure requirements for
protection of the borrower, but only twenty-eight of the fifty states
(plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) have established rate
ceilings.24 The rate ceilings in the twenty-one states with ceilings in
January 1968 were all below the UCCC ceilings. But UCCC rate
ceilings would be a new element in the states that have no rate ceilings
on retail instalment sales.
What are the arguments for placing rate ceilings on retail transac-
tions? The answer, briefly, is that both retailers and the financial in-
stitutions which purchase retail credit contracts have the same
opportunity as cash lenders to serve customers who have urgent desires
or needs for goods and services, and who may not be able to judge the
relation between their needs and the cost. For the most part, the
dilemma posed by enacting a rate ceiling on retail instalment sales is
identical to that posed with respect to small cash loans. There is one
important difference, however. The retail seller can avoid the impact
of a rate ceiling by raising the price of the article he is willing to
cannot be ascertained, the sum of automobile credit, other consumer goods credit, and
repair and modernization loans represent about 70% of the total. Only a very small
part of this proportion could be open-end retail credit. The proportion of the remaining
segment, personal loans, which is closed-end, is probably larger than the proportion of
open-end loans outstanding. See the August, 1968 figures in the Fe. RESERVE BuLL.,
Table A-52 (Dec. 1968).
22 Compare the rate ceilings in UCCC § 2.207 (revolving charge accounts) with those
contained in § 3.201 (unsupervised consumer loans) and § 3.508 (supervised loans).
23 Alabama, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming. The law in a fifth state,
Arkansas, was upset by Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249
S.W.2d 973 (1952), which held that most ordinary sales finance transactions were subject
to the 10, constitutional usury provision.
24 Most retail instalment financing laws are either motor vehicle laws or "all goods"
laws. The latter may or may not cover the financing of motor vehicles and revolving
credit transactions. Within the "umbrella ceiling" set by the UCCC, the rate ceiling set
under the "all goods" laws would most closely approximate the ceilings placed on the
highest cost credit transactions.
498 [Vol. 54:491
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finance. Viewed realistically, the practice presents the same potentiality
for exploitation as loan sharking. And like loan sharking, it need not
trade solely on the ignorance of the borrower to reach agreement but
it may apply to a credit sale intelligently transacted by the buyer. For
example, if the urgency of the borrower's need is well above the legal
thirty-six per cent rate ceiling and the likelihood of repayment from
the borrower warrants a fifty per cent per annum rate, then even if the
borrower knows that he cannot be charged more than thirty-six per
cent, he may be perfectly willing to be charged a cash price which is
inflated by the present value of the finance charge in excess of thirty-
six per cent. There are no elements of exploitation in this transaction,
since the market is merely giving both' buyer and seller the desired
transaction consistent with a legal framework which limits finance
charge revenues to thirty-six per cent per annum. The potentiality for
exploitation, however, arises when the buyer cannot compute the
present value of the "hidden finance charge" in excess of the UCCG
rate ceiling.
Under the UCC, the borrower desirous of purchasing the article
cannot get a cash loan at all if he cannot qualify for it at the ceiling
rate unless supervised cash loans are made jointly with the sale of goods
and nonfinancial consumer services.25 The cash lender typically has no
price to inflate to offset the ceiling on his finance charge revenue. Thus
the credit seller who caters to marginal credit buyers has the only legal
avenue for exploiting his customer-by inflating his cash prices. The
typical retail seller who caters to both a cash and a credit clientele will
find that if he raises his cash prices to accommodate his high-risk
credit customers, he will lose cash customers. So most retailers will not
utilize this avenue for meeting the demands of marginal credit pur-
chasers beyond whatever point their decline in revenues from cash sales
makes inflating cash prices unprofitable. However, the retailer who
locates in a poor area, and sells his commodities or services almost
totally on credit is free to charge whatever cash price is consistent with
the credit needs of his clientele. If he charges a single, high cash price
for a given product plus the ceiling rate for credit, that cash price
indicates that the bulk of his credit customers cannot qualify for cash
loans at legal rates and that they have behind their willingness a high
collective degree of urgency (or ignorance) to finance the goods. Such a
seller today is a "sales credit shark," the modern day counterpart of the
loan shark.
25 See generally UCCC § 3.501.
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The UCCC does fi6t prevent such legal expl6itation but it does
discourage it in several Ways. Pirft, the efiactment bf a legal rate ceiling
prevents an unscrupulous seller or lender from inflating the finance
charge, but not the cash price, beyond a certain point. Nevertheless,
the very enactment of rate ceilings has the effect of sending marginal
credit customers either to illegal loan sharks or to sales credit sharks
who are willing to inflate cash prices. By setting rate ceilings high, the
UCCC limits their relevance to fewer cases which involve unconscion-
able rates.26 Accordingly, there must be enforcement aimed specifically
at the credit sellers who are in a position to evade the purpose of the
rate ceiling. Later, I shall contend that enfordement provided by the
UCCC is less than adequate.2 7
Second, the UCCC proponents can argue, and rightly so, that an
unscrupulous retailer Would, in the absence of rate ceilings, charge
both the highest possible price and the highest possible finance charge.
Thus, the rate ceiling limits his methods of exploitation to price ad-
justment which can only partially compensate for the lower finance
charge revenue. But this reply is not enough to justify the shifting of
marginal borrowers away from highly supervised, licensed cash lenders
to illegal lenders and largely unsupervised ctedit retailers. Even with
lowered profits on each transaction, they will gain volume as business
shifts to them in states where rate ceilings tofl cash loans are lowered
by the UCCG and will retain existifig business ifn states which already
limit rates on cash loans at the UGCC ceilings. In those states where
rate ceilings on cash loans Will be raised by the UCOC, there will be a
redistribution of borrowers back towards the supervised cash loan
lenders. This is thi quid pro quo which edn obtain a consensus from
lenders whose interests are national in scope. The borrowers Who will
be served by cash lenders at the UCCG rate ceilings are not as marginal
as those who must go to high-price, low-quality credit retailers and to
loan sharks. Yet this kind of compromise is a poor substitute for reform
aimed at benefiting the poorest segment of society.
Proponents of the Code have a third afgument to answer the
criticism that recommended rate ceilings d6 not adequately control
exploitation by unscrupulous credit retailers. The Code gives the state
official who serves as Administrator po-vwr to nitiate court injunctions
against credit sellers or lenders Who mnake or enforce unconscionable
26 Id. § 5.108. Since a charge or practice expressly permitted by the UCCc is not,
in itself, unconscionable, setting higher rate ceilings narrows the range of unconscionable
rates.
27 See pp. 516-22 infra.
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terms in consumer credit transactions. 28 If the state official, either by
complaint or on his own discovery, finds that a retailer is setting credit
terms in accordance with the law but charging exorbitant prices be-
cause his clientele must have credit in order to purchase, a court could
conceivably enjoin such behavior.29 In this manner, the UCCC skirts
the problem of directly regulating pricing practices of credit retailers.
The protection offered by rate regulation and the dubious use of
injunctions is not enough. Since a seller can raise prices partially to
compensate for a rate ceiling which does not otherwise permit him to
extend credit to a marginal risk, he has, in effect, a higher effective
rate ceiling than that allowed cash lenders-up to a point. That point
is reached when, in the judgment of the Administrator and the court,
there exists an unconscionable credit transaction or series of transac-
tions from a given credit seller. But no one knows whether a court will
take action or how far out of line with comparable prices a credit
retailer's prices would have to be for a court to enjoin his behavior as
unconscionable. Accordingly, there is a permissible margin between
the allowable credit risk that a retailer can accept and that which a
cash lender can accept when the rate ceiling is the same for both. This
means that the marginal borrower can transact legally with certain
unsupervised credit retailers while the same transaction with a highly
supervised cash lender would be illegal. Thus, the Code itself wrongly
diverts transactions away from highly supervised lenders whose financial
records and operations are now subject to regular examination by
state officials.
To subject all closed-end credit sales transactions to the same
constraints imposed upon high-risk lenders would require a system of
examination and record keeping that would be expensive in light of
the small percentage of borrowers protected. But this problem could
be resolved by framing a distinction between "supervised" and "un-
supervised" credit sellers which parallels that between "supervised" and
"unsupervised" lenders under the UCCC. For example, supervised
credit sellers and supervised lenders would be those able to charge
more than, say twenty-four per cent per annum, provided that they
undergo the same degree of supervision.
A revised rate ceiling could be enacted at forty-eight per cent per
annum on supervised credit extensiops up to $00 and forty-two per
cent on supervised credit extensions between $100 and $30030 and from
28 UCCC § 6.111.
29 Ia.
30 See p. 497 supra.
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twenty-one per cent to twenty-four per cent on supervised credit ex-
tensions up to $1,000. Both unsupervised credit sellers and unsuper-
vised cash lenders could be barred from making credit extensions at
rates above twenty-four per cent per annum. Thus, supervised credit
sellers who are heavily dependent upon the business of marginal credit
risks could be subject to the same supervision and extra costs of report-
ing the details of income, expense and balance sheet information about
their credit operations as are presently carried by supervised cash
lenders. Both groups should also be subject to regular examination
instead of the looser procedures now prescribed by the UCCC.31 The
advantages of such a system are twofold. First, smaller-sized, higher-risk
credit extensions would be subject to scrutiny. The reporting informa-
tion and examination procedures would reveal the degree to which
credit losses are being subsidized by high prices so that an Administra-
tor could more easily judge what is unconscionable. Second, the po-
tential for exploitation of marginal borrowers by credit retailers
through price shifting would be limited by the extra supervision ap-
plicable to sellers catering to marginal credit risks.
To summarize, the rate ceilings enacted in the UCCC free the
great mass of transactions from current limits so that, if the impetus
given to competition by other sections of the Code remains, most
closed-end consumer credit transactions will be priced competitively
for both the credit sales and cash lending alternatives. However, in the
actual setting of rate ceilings in the credit (or loan) bracket of $300 or
less, the UCCC departed from its objectives of setting rate ceilings
high relative to the costs of extending credit. A large proportion of
these loans will necessarily be made at ceiling rates because of the
fixed cost element in the finance charge. Finally, in many areas of the
country where poorer credit risks are located, the lowered UCCC
rate ceilings on both small loans and small sales credit extensions will
enhance the exploitation of marginal credit risks by illegal lenders and
their legal counterparts, the low-quality, high-priced retail stores who
can, under the Code, extract what I shall deliberately call "uncon-
scionable prices." The price is unconscionable because the usury in
the finance charge is transferred to the price of the product or service
sold. This technique is analogous to the practice of loan sharks who
charge legal finance rates but add fees and other charges. The decision
as to what constitutes usury remains as imprecise as ever; the UCCC,
outside of regulating usury laws, avoids the term. The concept of un-
31 UCCC §§ 6.104 -.106.
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conscionability,32 as applied to the loan contract and the credit contract
or lease, is a good substitute for "usury" since it permits the court to
go beyond the express terms of the UCCG to determine what is
illegal.8 3 It is inadequate, however, as the only check upon uncon-
scionable prices resulting from credit agreements with marginal credit
risks.
My solution for these inconsistencies in what otherwise is most
constructive legislation is to maintain the uniformity in rate ceilings
for supervised credit transactions under the UCCC for both credit sales
and cash loan closed-end credit, raise the ceiling rates in the two
lowest credit size brackets, and require credit sellers who wish to
qualify for the higher rate ceilings to submit to the same degree of
supervision and examination as cash lenders. Otherwise, if the credit
seller does not wish to take advantage of- the rate ceilings which will
allow him to compete for marginal credit risks, he can remain unsuper-
vised and subject to a twenty-four per cent per annum rate ceiling.
B. Open-End Credit: Sales and Loans
Open-end instalment credit sales and loan transactions represent
the widely burgeoning phenomenon in the United States known as
"revolving credit." There are a number of variants of revolving credit,
known popularly as revolving charge accounts, credit cards, charge
account banking, and check-credit plans. All such plans have in com-
mon the open-end characteristic; that is, the outstanding balance can
be changed during the life of the agreement by additional credit pur-
chases or loans with some provision for fractional instalment repay-
ment of the outstanding balance.34
Rate ceilings under the UCCC differ according to whether the
revolving credit account is a credit sale or a cash loan. Rate ceilings on
revolving charge accounts (credit sales) allow a two per cent monthly
rate on that part of the balance which is $500 or less and a one and
one-half per cent monthly rate on that part of the balance which is
more than $500.35 On revolving loan accounts (cash loans) made by
32 Id. § 5.108.
33 See id. §§ 6.111(2), (3) & Comment. When credit is consistently granted at rates
which do not cover cost, and when profits from the credit sale of goods or services cover
losses and provide above-normal operating profits, and when cash prices are higher than
on similar products and services in the same geographic area, there is a prima fade case
for unconscionability under the UCCC.
34 In retail transactions, there is usually an interest-free period for lump-sum repay-
ment.
35 UCCC § 2.207(3).
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unsupervised lenders, there is a single, flat ceiling rate which, with
minor exceptions, may not exceed eighteen per cent per year based on
a one and one-half per cent monthly rate applied to the balance(s)
outstanding." Supervised lenders may extend revolving loans at the
ceilings provided for closed-end loans.37
The rationale for setting open-end credit rate ceilings lower than
closed-end transaction ceilings for credit sellers and unsupervised
lenders is not given in the final draft of the UCCC, despite regular
explanatory comments inserted after each major section. The omission
is particularly glaring in view of the following comment made to
explain rate ceilings for consumer credit sales other than revolving
credit accounts:
The absence of special rate ceilings according to the type of
credit grantors, type of item financed, or the form of credit extension
is by design. Segmentation of the market for credit by differentiated
rate ceilings tends to reduce competition and introduce rigidities
into the market that benefit a few suppliers at the expense of
others and work to the disadvantage of consumers.38
Why should open-end credit plans be a special case? Jordan and
Warren, the Reporter-Draftsmen of the UCCC, have offered some
clues, but not an answer:
The maximum rates allowed in revolving credit, which re-
flect in large measure prevailing market rates, are considerably
lower than those allowed in the smaller non-revolving credit trans-
actions. For small transactions revolving credit is a more effective
and efficient method of providing credit to the consumer, and the
lower rates reflect this efficiency. But revolving credit is generally
available only to consumers who are relatively good credit risks.
The less efficient non-revolving credit is still very prevalent and
will continue to be widely used, particularly with higher-risk
customers. The higher ceilings applicable to non-revolving credit
will allow it to continue. But the phenomenal growth of low-cost
revolving credit and the prospect of its future growth demonstrate
that reduction of cost to the consumer is more likely to come
about through efficient marketing spurred by competition than
through the existence of rate ceilings.39
This indicates that the reasoning behind special, lower rate ceil-
ings for open-end credit is not consistent with the UCCC's objective
36 Id. § 3.201.
37 Id. § 3.508.
38 Id. § 2.201, Comment 1(2) (emphasis added).
39 Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLum. L. RF-v, 387,
405 (1968) (emphasis added).
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of competition. The economic effect of a lower rate ceiling on open-
end credit transactions is to segment the market, allowing supervised
lenders the only chance to extend this kind of credit to high-risk bor-
rowers. By setting the rate ceiling on unsipervised loans and credit
sales substantially below that proposed for closed-end credit transac-
tions on credit amounts below $1,000, the Code discourages extension
of open-end credit to high-risk borrovers and limits competition for
these borrowers to supervised lenders.
Why place these limits on the market for open-end credit? In the
long run, the procedures of credit-granting and collection, aided by a
virtually instantaneous flow of complete credit information, may well
justify the extension of open-end credit to marginal risks at rates
similar to or somewhat below what they now pay on closed-end credit.
Robert W. Johnson, Reporter-Economist for the UCCC's Special Com-
mittee, stated:
In spite of the desire to avoid segmentation of the rate ceiling,
it appeared necessary to make a distinction between the two basic
types of credit . . . . In part, the methods of levying finance
charges are quite different. Also, it was believed that the con-
tinuing relationship of the revolving-credit grantor with his cus-
tomer should result in relatively lower operating costs over time.
Consequently, rate ceilings on revolving credit are somewhat lower
than on other form of consumer instalment credit.40
The difference in methods of levying finance charges has little rel-
evance. Rather, it is primarily the difference in levels of rate ceiling
that brings about segmentation of markets. To remove differences in
the level of rate ceilings, the UCCC could have specified rate ceilings
on both revolving charge accounts and revolving loan accounts for
regulated lenderg and credit sellers which were similar to those on
closed-end credit; i.e., three per cent per month on that part of the
balance which is $300 or less, one and three-fourths per cent per month
on that which is more than $300 but less than $1,000, and one and one-
fourth per cent per month on that which is above $1,000.
The statement that a continuing relationship between the debtor
and his open-end creditor should eventually bring lower tost, is ldbOn-
sistent with the UCCC's philo ophy-to set rate ceilings high and en-
courage competition to set rates, Setting rate ceilings at actual or
expected future levels will only allow the market t6 grant credit to
borrowers currently receiving credit of thi type. Mbfover, it is hard
40 Johnson, Economic Ratiohale ol the Uniform donsurier dredii dade, b J. VIi4.
303, 509 (1968).
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to find any logic behind the Reporter-Draftsmen's justification--"that
the higher [rate] ceilings applicable to non-revolving credit will allow
it to continue." 41 If revolving credit is eventually to supplant non-
revolving credit, the case for allowing it to be a competitive alternative
for all competitors under a single, uniform rate ceiling is strong.
A further inconsistency with the UCCC's stated rate ceiling
philosophy is represented by the different rate ceilings applied to re-
volving charge accounts and revolving loan accounts. The UCCC again
offers no explanatory comment.42 Nor is the reason inherent in the
difference between the two categories-that the contractual arrange-
ment for a revolving charge account is between seller and buyer whereas
the contractual arrangement for a revolving loan account is between
lender and buyer. Perhaps the drafters of the Code believed the same
ceiling was not needed for revolving loans because the lender typically
charges a discount on the value of the purchases made by the card
holder when he remits his payment to the seller. But the competition
for the seller's accounts fixes the size of the highly variable discount.
Furthermore, the growth of credit card arrangements has decreased
the size of discounts which lenders can obtain from sellers, and the day
may not be far away when there will be no discount at all.43
Thus, one objection to a different (lower) rate ceiling on revolving
loan accounts than on revolving charge accounts is that it fosters the
current practice of the lender discounting sellers' receivables instead
of obtaining all of the credit revenue from the finance charge paid by
the buyer-debtor. Whenever the allowable rate ceiling provides insuf-
ficient revenue to offer the loan service, the lender is forced to discount
receivables. Legislating a rate ceiling of eighteen per cent per annum,
when the current rates (excluding discounts) are predominantly at
that level, offers little chance that the practice of discounting will
disappear entirely. Even if rate ceilings on the two open-end categories
are uniform, the problem remains if the ceilings are set at a low level.
41 Jordan & Warren, supra note 39, at 405. See p. 504 supra.
42 Perusal of the previous drafts of the UCCC will show that the difference in rate
ceiling crept in some time after Working Draft No. 6, dated Dec. 4, 1967, and before the
Tentative Final Draft (Working Draft No. 8) prepared for the meeting of the NCCUSL,
July 22-Aug. 1, 1968. All of the previous drafts, beginning with the second working
draft, contained a uniform rate ceiling for open-end credit accounts (which was below
the ceiling for closed-end credit accounts).
43 Indeed, in automobile financing it is customary for the bank or sales finance
company to rebate to the dealer some portion of the finance charge, rather than to
charge him for the privilege of having his customer's purchase financed on a closed-end
credit transaction.
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But if the higher rate ceilings recommended for closed-end transactions
are utilized for all categories, there would be no fostering of discount
practices on credit card arrangements. Nevertheless, even removal of
rate ceilings would not completely end discounting. Some lenders
prefer to charge relatively low rates to borrowers and then charge the
seller a discount, and they are free to do so with or without rate ceil-
ings. But market forces under the freedom of no or high rate ceilings
could change the practice.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine appreciable cost differences be-
tween financing purchases with credit cards issued by lenders and with
credit cards issued by sellers. This alone is sufficient reason for uniform
ceilings on revolving credit accounts.
C. Unsupervised Loans
The UCCC introduces new regulatory classifications in order to
clarify differential treatment of vendors and lenders. First, all consumer
credit sales (and consumer related sales) are regulated under the
Code.44 Second, only those consumer loans carrying a rate of charge in
excess of ten per cent per annum on the unpaid balance are regulated
loans.45 Third, a supervised (licensed) consumer loan is "a regulated
loan in which the rate of the loan finance charge exceeds 18 per cent
per year .... ,,46
These definitions mean, in effect, that all credit sales are regulated
and none are supervised; a loan with a finance charge rate of less than
ten per cent per annum is unregulated and unsupervised, between ten
and eighteen per cent is regulated but unsupervised, and over eighteen
per cent is both regulated and supervised. One major reason for these
distinctions is that the time-price doctrine47-- carefully preserved by
the framers of the UCCC-provides justification for continuing dif-
ferential treatment of sellers and lenders who, despite this antiquated
doctrine, are in essence both selling the same product-consumer
instalment credit. By leaning upon this weak reed from the past which
has allowed credit sales greater freedom from regulation than cash
loans, the UCCC contents itself with broadening the regulation of
credit sales-but not by so much as to make it equivalent to the
regulation of cash loans.
Clearly the eighteen per cent rate ceiling on unsupervised loans
44 UCCC §§ 2.102, 2.602.
45 Id. § 3.501(1).
46 Id. § 3.501(3).
47 See pp. 508-11 infra.
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is meant t6 allow unlitensed lenders to make larger loans on a basis com-
parable to credit sales, But on loans that require rates above eighteen
per cent, the lender must get a license, granted only with the approval
of the Administrator, who approves the financial responsibility, charac-
ter and fitness of the owners, officers and directors of the lending
corporation. Financial organizations chartered to make loans and to
receive deposits, including share or thrift accounts, and who are already
supervised by a state or federal official do not have to obtain a license
from the Administrator of the UCCC. Nevertheless the degree of super-
vision contemplated under the UCCG is so moderate as to make the
only real barrier a questionable record of financial responsibility,
character and fitness. It would be preferable to make parallel require-
ments applicable to credit sales as well as to cash loans where super-
vised credit agencies in both categories would be those charging more
then twenty-four per cent. Moreover, an Administrator should refrain
from interpreting character and fitness requirements strictly and in-
stead place gteater emphasis upon regular examination and supervision
of supervised credit agencies than is now required in the UCCC. The
Reporter-Draftsmen point up the dilemma faced by the framers of the
UCCC:
A persuasive case can be made that whatever potential for mis-
treating and deceiving the borrower that may exist in the loan
field exists in equal or greater measure in the sales field. But the
licensing of sellers of goods or services has never been the practice
in this country. Indeed, many would find it completely repugnant
to our notions of free enterprise. True, if lenders and credit sellers
are performing economically similar functions it seems reasonable
to impose the same restrictions-or grant the samt freedom-to
both. But hundreds of years of suspicion of moneylending, often
grounded in religious convictions, are not easily overcome.48
It is unfortunate that matters of substatice mist bow to political
realities based upon the tradition of suspicion of money lenders. Must
the NCCUSL ignore the fact that changing times have shifted the
source of many abuses of the poor from money lenders to credit sellers?
III
MARKET SEGREGATION AND LIMITATION
A. The Time-Price Doctriffi
The foregoing discussion of UCCG rate ceilings points up the
difficulties in achieving stated objectives while trying to reach a con-
48 Jordan & Warren, supra note 39, at 402-03.
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sensu among representatives of affected segments of the public and of
the consumer credit industry. But one of the first compromises, which
opened the door to virtually all of the diversity in UCCC rate ceilings,
was the decision to preserve the artificial distinction between credit
sales and cash lending based upon the legal fiction that marking up of
a cash price to a time price established a time-price differential which
was not interest and therefore not subject to usury laws. 49 This doctrine
had been sharply criticized by William D. Warren, one of the Reporter-
Draftsmen,50 and the first tentative draft submitted to the 1966 Annual
Meeting of the NCCUSL did not separate credit sales from cash loans.
Warren described the legal situation then in a manner applicable
today:
Traditionally, credit sales have been exempt from the usury acts
on the theory that the finance-charge increment of a time "sale"
differs from the interest obligation of a "loan." In recent years,
however, in obvious recognition of the artificiality of the time-
price-cash-price dichotomy, courts have adopted hypertechnical
exceptions to the traditional rule whenever the equities of a case
have so prompted. Overall, the result is unfortunate: a general rule
-to the effect that a time price cannot be usurious-which is
hard to support when the true incidents of the credit transaction
are comprehended; and numerous exceptions to the rule that seem
arbitrary and unreal in the context of contemporary commercial
practices. The bold alternatives open to courts under the usury
acts are no more appealing. By indiscriminately applying usury
statutes to credit sales, they would threaten the flow of capital into
instalment credit; and if they give a blanket exemption to these
transactions, they leave the consumer with no protection against
excessive finance charges. 51
Clearly, the UCCC, if enacted in its present form, will represent
a giant step forward from the current hodge-podge of state laws, many
of which are based on the time-price distinction between credit sales
and loans. Nevertheless, the function of an academic observer is not
to pretend that what has been formulated is ideal in order that it can
be implemented in the legislatures. Rather it is to point out what, in
the opinion of one economist, might have better served the interests
of the market for consumer instalment credit.
Homer Kripke claims that debate over the time-price doctrine is
a waste of energy: "Since sale credit and loan credit are both regulated
49 The major cases customarily cited are Beete v. Bidgood, 7 B.&C. 453, 108 Eng.
Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827), and Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861).
50 Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE LJ.
839, 845, 851 (1959).
51 Id. at 866-67.
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in the proposed NCCUSL Bill, and for the most part in identical terms,
what difference does it make to these zealots [advocates of consumer
protection] what one calls the regulated amount?" 52 I would contend
that maintaining the time-price distinction has been costly to the
achievement of the UCCC's objectives in three ways. First, it has
provided a basis for lack of uniformity in rate ceilings on credit trans-
actions having equivalent economic status in the market. What dif-
ference does it make if a purchase is financed by a credit card originated
by a seller or lender-a department store card system or a bank card
system under which a department store contracts with a bank to
finance his customers? Second, it has permitted the UCCC to extend a
historical bias to license high-rate lenders without providing similar
constraints upon those retailers who are competitors with lenders in
the high-rate credit field. Third, it has multiplied the verbiage in what
was intended to be a simple, clear-cut model bill. To assess the degree of
uniformity in the treatment of credit sales and cash loans, one must
refer back and forth from credit sales (Article 2) to loans (Article 3)
comparing language which is for the most part identical but which
contains some significant differences-differences which work only to
the advantage of the favored. If there were some social advantage to
be obtained by interfering with the market along these lines, I would
not complain. But I see none.
In the prefatory note, the UCCC offers an explanation:
[he Committee was and is aware that, sociologically and eco-
nomically, sales credit and loan credit are alike and that their
separate treatment results in much duplication in drafting. Never-
theless, we are mindful of the weight given to Uniform Acts by
Courts of States which have not enacted them. Thus, long before
the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted or even introduced
in New York, the New York Court of Appeals relied in part on a
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code in overruling the
Court's prior decisions on privity of contract and determining
who may recover upon a breach of warranty in a sale of goods.
The Committee believes that any encouragement to the courts of
a State which has not enacted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
to rely on the Code's provisions to reject the time sale price doc-
trine would have most unfortunate social and economic conse-
quences for both consumers and credit grantors.53
Perhaps because I am not a lawyer, this reasoning seems short-
52 Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLuM.
L. REv. 445, 453 (1968).
53 UCCC, Prefatory Note at 8.
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sighted. If a code is being drawn up to replace statutes based upon
obsolescent court doctrines, is it worth the extra cost of trying to pre-
serve the doctrines until the code is passed? In verbiage alone, the
cost is huge. The UCCC is roughly twenty-five per cent longer than
it would be if Articles 2 and 3 were combined and the numbers of legal
definitions could be sharply reduced. The Consumer Credit Protection
Act provides a much simpler format: It lumps both credit sales and
loans under the same general term, credit,5 4 treats the seller or lender
as the creditor, and applies the term finance charge to both credit sales
and loans.55 Open-end credit plans are not differentiated according to
whether they are offered by sellers or lenders.5 6 Finally, the federal
act contains a disclaimer, designed to prevent its passage from under-
mining the time-price doctrine in the states.57 Yet the example of the
federal Consumer Credit Protection Act does not meet entirely the
argument of the Commissioners quoted above, since it superimposes its
provisions upon, rather than replaces, existing state law.
Verbiage, however, is not the main problem. Rather it is the lack
of uniform treatment which crept in when credit sales and cash loans
were differentiated, adding segmentation and rigidity to the credit
market. It would take several years to get further agreement on uni-
formity. Meanwhile, and it may be quite a while, the stated objectives
of the Code's prefatory note will not be entirely achieved when and
if the UCCC is enacted by the states in its present form.
B. Ease of Entry
To make competition work, the UCCC prescribes relatively free
entry into all segments of the market for consumer instalment credit.
Credit sellers will be able to enter the cash lending business at rates
above the old usury limits, banks will be able to enter the consumer
finance business, and licensed lenders will be able to purchase credit
contracts originated by credit sellers. In short, under the umbrella of
UCCC regulation, virtually anyone can extend consumer instalment
credit in any form, unless other limitations apply. Only supervised
cash lenders are restrained under the UCCC and then only by the
license qualifications of character, financial responsibility, and fitness.
Ease of entry was deemed necessary to make price competition effec-
64 Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 103(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(e) (Supp. 1969).
55 Id. § 103(*), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(i) (Supp. 1969).
50 Id. § 127, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637 (Supp. 1969).
57 Id. § 111, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1610 (Supp. 1969).
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tive and to bring rates for all but truly marginal credit risks below
legal rate ceilings.
Will the experiment work? Some fifty years of experimentation
under state legislation based on the Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL)bs
offers some clues. Before the fifth draft of the USLL, entry into the
regulated small loan business was relatively free. The fifth draft,
promulgated in 1932, conditioned licenses upon the applicant's fitness,
the convenience and advantage of the community, and minimum
capital requirements. The provision authorizing the restriction upon
licenses according to "convenience and advantage" of the community
now permeates thirty-three of the forty-eight small loan laws, but it is
applied with different severity among these states. The fifth draft im-
plemented this change in regulatory philosophy based upon events
of the 1920's. According to F. B. Hubachek,
Between 1923 and the publication of the Fifth Draft in Jan-
uary, 1932, far reaching changes took place in the business carried
on by licensees and in the entire consumer credit field.
A certain sequence of events had followed the enactment of
many small loan laws. First, the loan sharks disappeared. Then the
regulated business began to expand. Due to improved lending
techniques, increased volume of business, and the availability of
public capital, it had become possible to make an attractive net
return. A time came when there were too many licensed lenders
and too many dollars ... to be lent. Competition so far had been
effective only to a very limited extent in reducing the rates of
charge. Instead, it took the form of excessive solicitation and over-
lending. This in turn led to the borrower's delinquency which
fostered collection abuses. These troubles gradually came into
bold relief as the industrial states accumulated ten to fifteen years
of experience.
By 1931 it had become apparent that increased regulation of
the licensed lending business was required. This was provided in
the Fifth Draft which contained sweeping innovations. The higher
interest privilege became more incidental and the general import
of the act was changed to a code of business regulation.59
It was common for legislative reform in the 1930's to stress com-
petitive excesses in the 1920's as a cause for difficulties experienced by
financial institutions during the Great Depression. The mood of that
time was to establish regulatory codes which did not rely upon com-
58 The USLL is reprinted ir B. CURRA&, TRErDS IN CONSUMER LEiSLATION 144-57
(1965). See note 13 supra.
59 Hubachek, The Development of Reglatwry Sniall Loan Lawl, 8 LAW & CoNTEmp.
PROB. 108, 121-22 (1941) (footnote omitted).
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petitive forces to revive a depressed economy. The enactment of rate
ceilings on time deposits solicited by commercial banks and the prohibi-
tion of interest paid on demand deposits are cases in point. These
measures were taken to keep commercial banks' loans and investments
conservative by removing the pressures of rate competition for deposit
funds which had encouraged them to reach fQr riskier, higher-yielding
loans and investments. Yet recent studies of commercial bank behavior
during the period prior to the banking collapse do not support this
hypothesis.10 Nor does it seem evident that excesses in overlending
characterized the consumer finance industry. The ratios of the expense
of bad debts and insurance against loss to average employed assets in
1929 and 1930 were less than two per cent, well below ratios reached
between 1932 and 1934 and similar to the ratio in 1936.61 The causes
of increased delinquency noted by Hubachek may well have been the
fact of economic recession, not "too many licensed lenders and too
many dollars ... to be lent."
More relevant, however, to the relative ease of entry proposed by
the UCCC, is Hubachek's comment that "competition so far had been
effective only to a very limited extent in reducing the rate of charge."
If this was the case, can we expect the easing of entry in the UCCC
to accomplish the desired end of bringing rates below legal rate ceilings?
The structure of the consumer finance industry has remained one
which is basically oligopolistic, described by Clyde Phelps in 1944
as follows; "Because of service differentiation the elasticity of demand
for... loan services.., is low, and therefore [the lender] may be still
further inclined to avoid initiating rate competition and to utilize
other means of maximizing profits or minimizing losses." 62 As ex-
perience since World War !I has demonstrated, there has been little
rate competition to disprove this description. Before 1932, however,
there was more reason for price competition to have brought rates
below legal ceilings. Yet there was little rate competition between 1916
and 1932 except for one major effort to cut rates.6 3
60 A.H. Cox, JR., REqILATiON OF INTEREST RATES ON BANK DEPOSITS 31-74 (1966);
C. HAYWOOD & C. LINKE, THE REGULATION OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES 2 (1968); L. RITTER,
REGULATION Q: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIvES 37 (1965).
61 R. YOUNG, PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 110, Table
31 (1940).
62 Phelps, Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition in Consumer Loans, 8 J. MKTG.
382, 383 (1944).
63 The development of vigorous competition among the licensed small loan com-
panies began in 1928 when one of the great chains, operating in practically all
of the industrial states having effective small loan laws, took the initiative in
cutting its rates to 2V2% per month on unpaid principal balances. At first very
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Under the UCCG proposals, however, entry into the cash lending
business has a much broader base. By putting existing financial institu-
tions under the same legal rate ceilings, there should be many more
lenders willing to make higher-risk loans than the existing consumer
finance companies-presently the only group allowed to charge the
highest rates. Moreover, the consumer finance companies will be free
to expand the number of their offices, especially in those states which
had restrictive "convenience and advantage" control of entry. In addi-
tion, there are no restrictions, beyond those of financial responsibility,
character, and fitness of the applicant, to govern eligibility for a license to
make supervised cash loans, and no license is needed to make regulated
loans. There is no reason why retailers and other non-financial firms
cannot apply for licenses to make supervised cash loans on the same
premises where they sell products and services.64 Meanwhile, there are
no restrictions upon eligibility to make unsupervised, regulated loans
at rates which are less than eighteen per cent. Finally, the lack of any
licensing or other constraints upon sales credit will continue to subject
cash lenders to unrestricted competition from credit sellers of goods
and services.
The framers of the UGCG state plainly that their intent is to rely
upon "competition fostered by disclosure [to] generally force rates
below the permitted maximum charges."6' 5 And, "[a] secondary purpose
is to reduce the likelihood of establishing localized monopolies in the
granting of cash credit."6 6 Given past experience, it would appear that
few competitors met the cut (perhaps partly because they felt somewhat pro-
tected by service differentiation but probably mainly because they had been
accustomed to charging the legal maximum rates for so long that they regarded
rate-cutting as incomprehensible and undoubtedly a temporary phenomenon)
so the company greatly expanded its business, thus setting the stage for a bitter
competitive struggle.
But before this could materialize, the great business depression struck, sub-
stantially increasing losses and costs, and it was not until 1926 that rate com-
petition among small loan companies was renewed on a widespread scale ...
By 1941, because of this price competition among the licensed small loan com-
panies, the maximum rates charged on a large part of their loans in most of the
states having effective small loan laws were lower than the legal maximums.
Id. at 386. Phelps portrays a more active state of price competition than that implied
by Hubachek. Yet it is fair to assume that price competition was limited even in the
1930's, and more so in the years since World War II.
64 This contrasts sharply with the provisions of many small loan statutes based on
the Uniform Small Loan Law which prohibited any other business in the same office
unless the Commissioner found that such business would not facilitate evasions of the
USLL. USSL § 12(a) (7th Draft 1942), reprinted in CURRAN, supra note 13.
65 UCCC § 3.503, Comment.
66 Id.
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if competition is to work at all in the pricing of higher-risk credit,
there had better be free entry. Other than the plaintive cry of self-in-
terest, the only logical attack upon free entry should come from an
alleged lack of benefit to the borrower from competition. I have sug-
gested that parallel regulation and supervision should be extended
to high-rate credit selling in order to protect the marginal consumer
borrower. But the test of the effectiveness of competition in providing
benefits to other borrowers will come when it is determined that the
structure of the entire consumer credit industry will allow finance rates
to fall below legal rate ceilings for all but marginal credit risks.
There can be no assurance, under the conditions set by the UCCC,
that finance rates will fall below ceilings for borrowers formerly served
under the small loan statutes. For example, if most retailers and com-
mercial bankers choose not to offer cash loans at rates above eighteen
per cent, if there is no rush to establish new offices by consumer finance
companies, and if credit sellers do not adopt policies designed to compete
for cash borrowers, the status quo might prevail with consumer finance
company rates at or close to the newly-established rate ceilings. But one
thing is clear. If the Commissioners were to give ground and compro-
mise their position on relatively free entry, their whole concept of set-
ting high rate ceilings might become a device by which vendors and
lenders could set non-competitive (monopolistic) rates to divide the
high-risk market. The losers in this regard would be the higher-risk
consumer borrowers. Disclosure and the ability to substitute liquid
assets for debt would suffice to protect the better credit risks.
Predictably, those most concerned about the effects of free entry
upon the consumer borrower are the commercial banks, whose trade
associations registered strong dissents to the NCCUSL at its July
1968 meeting.67 Commercial banks, already subject to "convenience
and need" requirements for the establishment of new banks and
branches, stand to gain nothing from the free entry aspect of the Code
except the prospect of more non-bank competitors in every neighbor-
hood. Bankers are also concerned about removal of the limits on size
of loan, term, and types of lending allowed under consumer and sales
finance company laws today. In short, although banks have enjoyed
a great expansion in the kinds and types of activities which they are
allowed to pursue under recent rulings of the United States Comp-
67 Telegrams dated July 24, 1968 from Charis E. Walker, Exec. Vice Pres., ABA, to
Alfred A. Buerger, Chairman of the Spedal Comm. on Retail Installment Sales, Con-
sumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury, and from Robert A. Fischer, Exec. Dir. of the
Consumer Bankers Ass'n to William J. Pierce, Pres., NCCUSL.
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troller of the Currency and liberalization of state laws, they are not
prepared to endorse the concept of competition when their prerogatives
are threatened, at least as far as consumer credit is concerned. Although
commercial bank opposition smacks strongly of self-interest rather
than concern for the consumer borrower, there is a question of conflict-
ing regulatory philosophies governing banks relative to other non-bank
financial institutions. If non-bank institutions are not subject to stan-
dards of convenience and need, why should banks be? The answer is
that commercial banks hold deposit funds, and bank failures
are a calamity to depositors who find themselves without liquid funds
when banks are closed. Academic economists have argued that today,
with deposit insurance and other protections against severe depressions,
banks can be allowed to compete and fail in the same manner as non-
banking institutions. Until this question is resolved in favor of compe-
tition and the equal right to fail in banking, enactment of the UCCC
will place commercial bankers at a competitive disadvantage as far
as free entry is concerned. But this does not mean that the consumer
borrower will not be better served when relatively free entry is a
basic element of the UCCQ.
The UCCC provision of relatively free entry is essential if compe-
tition is to be effective in the higher-rate, "supervised" loan category.
In advocating parallel supervised credit status for consumer credit
sales, I recognize the risk that entry by retailers and others who do not
want to submit to supervision may be discouraged, but the risk is
worth taking in order to protect the marginal borrower from credit
abuse. These are the people whose needs are strongest and whose
vulnerability to exploitation is greatest. Not that the great mass of
typical credit transactions require supervision, but rather closer atten-
tion must be paid to vendors and lenders catering to high-risk cus-
tomers. But it is in the area of administration and enforcement that I
find the UCCG weakest,
IV
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND ENFORCEMENT
The framers of the UCCC steered a middle path between heavy
administrative controls which characterize small loan legislation and
private remedies available to consumers who are willing to invoke
legal processes under retail instalment sales acts. The Administrato,
charged with enforcement of the Code, is freed from many of the
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stipulations binding him to annual examination of every licensee,
collection and publication of composite reports collected from every
licensed office, and application of "convenience and advantage" stan-
dards to applications for a license for each new office. Under the UCCC,
a supervised lender may get a single license which does not limit the
number of his offices, he does not have to file an annual report, and
he does not have to pay for the Administrator's investigations.
In place of close examination and supervision of licensees, the
UCCC's Administrator is empowered to act to terminate objectionable
conduct by credit sellers as well as by supervised and unsupervised
lenders and is given ample powers to investigate6s and issue enforce-
ment orders69 against violations of the Act. He may apply for injunc-
tions to prevent 'Unconscionable Agreements and Fraudulent or
Unconscionable Conduct"70 as well as to restrain more specific viola-
tions of the Act,71 He can bring a civil action against a creditor for
making or collecting charges in excess of those permitted by the Code
and the court can require the respondent to pay not more than "the
greater of either the amount of the credit service or loan finance
charge or ten times the amount of the excess charge" if the creditor
has deliberately or recklessly violated the Code or refused to return
an excess charge.72 Finally, the Administrator can bring a civil action
against an offender who willfully and repeatedly violates the Act, in
which case the civil penalty may be up to five thousand dollars.73
Thus, the UCCC places a large grant of power in the hands of the
Administrator and considerable freedom to utilize it.
Nevertheless, the Administrator's enforcement is looked upon as
supplementary to private enforcement claims by the debtor. The debtor
can refuse to perform part of his contractual obligations (not pay the
credit service or loan finance charge) or obtain a refund of an excess
charge when the Act has been violated.74 For violations of the pro-
hibited negotiable instrument provisions, or limits on the schedule
68 UCCC § 6.106.
69 Id. § 6.108.
70 Id. § 6.111.
71 Id. § 6.110.
72 Id. § 6.113(1).
73 Id. § 6.113(2).
74 The debtor can collect his refund by lowering his payment or by bringing suit
against the creditor or his assignee. Id. § 5.202(3). If the refund is not made within a
reasonable time, the debtor may sue and recover a penalty set by the court in an
amount "not exceeding the greater of either the amount of the credit service charge or
ten times the amount of the excess charge." Id. § 5.202(4).
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of payments or loan term for regulated loans, the debtor has the right
to bring suit and recover an amount "not in excess of three times the
amount of the credit service charge or loan finance charge." 75 For viola-
tions of the disclosure provisions, a creditor is liable to the debtor for
twice the amount of the credit service or loan finance charge, provided
that the amount is within the range of $100 to $1,000."6 Further, the
debtor can, within three business days, rescind home solicitation
purchases and consumer credit sales or loans when a security interest is
taken in land now used or expected to be used as the debtor's resi-
dence.77 Finally, the debtor who is successful in his action may recover
reasonable attorney's fees.7 8
Allison Dunham, Executive Director of the NCCUSL, has sought
to justify the balance struck in the UCCC between private and ad-
ministrative enforcement:
To utilize private enforcement as the major sanction of this
Code requires us to make an unverifiable prediction as to the
future. ... The decision to rely on private sanctions is based in
part on an assumption that in the future, provision of legal services
for the lower economic segment of society and awareness of rights
and of legal services will increase as substantially as they have
increased in the past few years.... Although there is nothing in
the Code which provides for legal services for the lower income
portion of society, a statutory scheme giving debtors rights can
work as well as a deterrent only if the creditor segment of society
takes into account the probability of law suits for violations of the
Code.
We have not left the problem at this point, however. The
amount of recovery for an excess charge and the amount of dam-
age suffered from a failure to disclose is likely to be so small that
a consumer will not find it worth while [sic] to proceed. This
problem can be met partially in the legal system by assuming or
providing for a group or class action in which a group of persons
similarly situated join together and seek vindication of their rights
in one proceeding. Developments in the field of group or class
actions have been so rapid in recent years ... that we have con-
cluded that special provision for class action is unnecessary. The
possibility of this type of concerted legal action is one sanction
which we expect to operate. Finally, we have introduced two fac-
tors which may encourage self-help or use of the legal process. ...
[W]e have a specific provision allowing debtors to recover more
than their proved damage in order to stimulate debtors to protect
75 Id. § 5.202(1).
76 Id. § 5.203(i)(a).
77 Id. § 2.502.
78 Id. § 5.202(8).
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themselves against proscribed conduct .... Furthermore, we have
tried to enlist the active participation of the legal profession in
supporting debtors in their defenses by providing that the debtor
who is successful in establishing that the creditor has violated the
act may be awarded from the creditor the reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in prosecuting the successful law suit.7 9
Although these arguments are impressive, I am not wholly con-
vinced. In the bulk of credit sales and cash lending which is extended
to borrowers at rates of twenty-four per cent or less, the debtor's de-
fenses appear to be adequate. This covers virtually the whole range
of automobile financing (excepting older used cars), most of the
typical rates of charge on durable goods financing, revolving credit,
repair and modernization loans, and personal loans (excepting small
consumer finance company loans). But, as in the past, those who need
financing at rates above twenty-four per cent are mostly urban residents
who cannot qualify for credit at lower rates.
These individuals have need for credit and will obtain it, whether
from legal or illegal sources. The UGCCG offers a rate ceiling structure
that will allow many such citizens to qualify for credit when there is
a reasonable expectation that it can be repaid. For most other groups,
the provisions for rate disclosure and debtors' remedies will have
meaning and significance. But for the urban poor, many of whom are
alienated from society and afraid to assert their rights, there will be no
rush to utilize the procedures (including class actions) available to
them under the UCGG. Unless the militant organizations which have
sprung up in urban areas rally to the cause of the underprivileged
debtor, the efforts of others, the outside philanthropically-motivated
groups, will, I am afraid, be as insufficient in the future as they have
been in the past. The broader social, political and economic problems
facing the more militant organizations in urban poverty areas may well
deprive them of the resources and personnel to fight the battles of the
local debtor. Thus, even with disclosure and competition, the marginal
borrower, hampered by lack of knowledge and unable to shop competi-
tively, will retain his disadvantage.
The transition from highly regulated markets in states with
effective small loan laws and retail instalment sales acts to a relatively
free market where borrower and creditor confront one another with
relatively loose administrative regulation may prove difficult. An
abrupt shift from administrative enforcement to self-help could revive
70 Dunham, Unconscionable Conduct and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23
J. F. 812, 316-17 (1968).
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abuses as lenders and sellers test their rights under the UCCC. It will
take some time for precedents to set the standard of unconscionability,
and the new market conditions could foster a double standard-stores
that cater to marginal credit risks and offer rates of charge (buried in
goods prices) substantially higher than those offered by licensed cash
lenders. For this reason, as well as those noted earlier,8 0 I would ask
for a broadening of the class of supervised lenders to include supervised
credit sellers, thus placing all credit at rates above twenty-four per
cent under close administrative supervision.
As Allison Dunham explains, the UCCC does not rest its case
solely on self-help but utilizes the Administrator to set precedents for
the standard of unconscionability and to police the Act:
Thus, the current draft of the Code does not abolish licensing
but it attempts to reduce the routine business of the administra-
tor to a minimum so that he can concentrate his personnel on
ferreting out courses of dealing which violate the act. The act
does not eliminate license revocation altogether, but it tries to
force proceedings leading to elimination of wrongful conduct into
judicial proceedings rather than administrative determinations
which may or may not be made with full record and hearing.81
This puts a tremendous responsibility on the Administrator without
fully indicating how he should allocate his efforts and resources. If
I were convinced that he would devote at least three-quarters of his
investigations to credit sellers and lenders charging more than twenty-
four per cent (or the equivalent when finance charges are buried within
the cash prices of the goods), I would be less concerned. There is also
tremendous incentive for bribery when the Administrator does not have
to examine everyone's records during a stated time period. The
UCCC's omission of the requirement for an annual financial report
by each supervised lender deprives the Administrator of relevant clues
as to where to investigate. Besides acting upon complaints, his investi-
gating efforts will have to be based largely upon random sampling to
discover violations of the Code. These omissions suggest a lack of
concern for those whose bargaining positions are weakest.
If my suggestion were adopted (that supervised lenders and credit
sellers be defined to include those charging rates higher than twenty-
four per cent), the following administrative procedures would be
both practical and desirable:
80 See p. 508 supra.
81 Dunham, supra note 79, at 319.
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(1) Require annual examination of the credit accounts of super-
vised lenders and sellers.
(2) Require submission of an annual report from each supervised
lender or seller detailing operating income and expenses and balance
sheet data of the credit department and description of the procedures
used to establish rates of charge at each credit outlet.
(3) Require the Administrator to include in his published annual
report the composite income and expense and balance sheet data col-
lected from supervised lenders and sellers.
Possibly these procedures were not included because they could
apply only to supervised lenders, not to the unsupervised credit sellers
and their assignees. After permitting credit sellers the right to extend
credit at rates equivalent to (or greater than) those allowed to super-
vised lenders, it would have been inequitable to impose added costs of
examination and disclosure on only a segment of those serving higher-
cost borrowers.
But the advantages of these three requirements outweigh the dis-
advantages. First, annual examination would ensure that each super-
vised firm would know with certainty that its books would receive
detailed examination once a year and that its probability of successfully
evading the law is reduced. Second, the annual report would provide
a historical record against which current operating procedures and
current financial data could be appraised and would provide data
for the Administrator's departmental research. It would also offer dues
as to where possible violations of the act were occuring. ThirA, the
publication of the composite figures of income, expense, and balance
sheet data would serve to notify the public of the revenue-cost condi-
tions under which high-risk borrowers were being served in their state.
The public generally, and academic researchers in particular, would
have an opportunity to appraise the manner in which the act was
functioning. The main disadvantage of requiring these procedures
involves the extension of licensing to credit sellers. Credit sellers who
would otherwise enter the high-cost segment of the market could resist
direct supervision of their operations by not participating; this might
cut down competitiveness of the market for higher-risk borrowers.
Jordan and Warren explain why the Special Committee decided to
exempt retailers from licensing:
The Committee's decision not to license retailers was probably
due to its common sense belief that the expense of doing so would
be great and the gain to the consumer scant. Limitation of entry
into retailing is not in the economic tradition of the nation. Im-
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position of convenience and advantage limitations on entry was so
abhorrent that it was never considered, and there was no senti-
ment for even the lighter form of entry limitation embodied in
the character and fitness test. If entry into the field was not to be
limited, the only other legitimate functions that licensing retailers
could perform would be (1) administrative enforcement of the
Code, (2) notification to state officials of where the retailer is
operating and who he is, and (3) financial contribution by retailers
to the upkeep of the Administrator's office. Since each of the
enumerated functions is provided for all creditors in existing Code
provisions, the decision of the Committee to exclude retailers from
the licensing requirement seems sound.8 2
These arguments do apply to most retailers. But for those retailers
who wish to serve high-risk borrowers and set their prices accordingly,
I think their character, fitness, and financial responsibility is as relevant
for review as any lender's. If the rate for qualifying for licensing super-
vision were raised from the Code's eighteen per cent to twenty-four
per cent, there would be less added expense in the coverage of credit
sellers. Those who did not wish to be licensed would not have to
submit to detailed supervision and could continue their normal credit
operations which are now largely priced at equivalent annual rates
of less than twenty-four per cent. Yet those who decide that it is eco-
nomically desirable to serve this segment of the market could over-
come their scruples against licensing, as others have done. This segment
of the market, composed of people who have long since relinquished
their right to complain, is easily susceptible to harassment and abuse
and it is essential that gangster elements are not given easy access
to the market.
V
ADJUSTMENT OF DOLLAR AMOUNTS
Probably the least heralded but most important provision in the
UCCC is the specification that:
From time to time the dollar amounts in this Act designated
as subject to change shall change, as provided in this section, ac-
cording to and to the extent of changes in the Consumer Price
Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers: U. S. City
Average, All Items, 1957-59 = 100, compiled by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, and hereafter
referred to as the Index.Sa
Nothing to my knowledge has caused consumer credit legislation
82 Jordan & Warren, supra note 37, at 431.
83 UCCC § 1.106(1).
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to become obsolete more quickly during its history than changes in
prices. This is especially true of small loan laws, where rate ceilings are
graduated downward in intervals based upon fixed dollar amounts.
As prices rise, some portion of the dollar amount needed to keep the
purchasing power of the loan constant must be made under a lower
rate ceiling when it enters the next interval. Since the UCCC has
adopted the principle of graduated rate ceilings for closed-end credit
transactions, it is essential that dollar amounts be escalated accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Let us consider now the three questions posed earlier.84 How well
does the UCCC meet the objectives set? In general, it sharply increases
reliance upon competition to govern the consumer credit market, but
it falls far short of implementing competition through an umbrella-
type code with uniform treatment of financing sources. It differentiates
the treatment of vendors from that accorded lenders in both application
of rate ceilings and administrative supervision. It continues stratifica-
tion of the market by enacting lower rate ceilings for open-end trans-
actions than for closed-end transactions. In short, it lessens but does
not eliminate the stratification of consumer credit markets.
The answers to the second question, involving areas of compromise,
are apparent. First, and most important, the UCCC perpetuates the
time-price doctrine for superficial reasons. Second, credit sellers are of-
fered favored treatment both in terms of rate ceilings and supervision
despite the fact that cash lenders are given substantially higher rate
ceilings and less supervision than have hitherto existed. Third, con-
cessions made in the name of the consumer in the form of sharply
reduced creditors' remedies will accentuate the problems of the poor
in obtaining credit without providing them with opportunity to seek
competitive legal rates of charge reflecting their high-risk status on
loans of three hundred dollars or less. By leaving them the loophole
of obtaining accommodation from unsupervised credit sellers or loan
sharks, the UCCC has driven them outside of its umbrella of protec-
tion.
But finally, with respect to the question whether the consumer
credit market will be better served by the UCCC, the answer must be
an unqualified yes. Despite its compromises and concessions it repre-
sents a giant step forward in providing lower-cost competitive services
for consumer borrowers.
84 See p. 494 supra.
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